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TAXING TRANSFERS OF MORTGAGED PROPERTYt
Alvin D. Lurie*
One of the more troubled corners of the tax law is reserved for
transfers of mortgaged property. Taxable dispositions of property result
in gain or loss depending on whether the "amount realized" from the
disposition of the property is greater or less than the adjusted cost basis.'
It is a simple thing to determine the "amount realized" where the
transferor receives cash or other property of readily determinable value
in full consideration for his own property. The problem occasioned by
a sale of encumbered property is that the cash or equivalent considera-
tion will reflect the encumbrance in that it will be reduced by the amount
of the encumbrance on the property.
The question then arises whether the amount of the mortgage is added
to the cash or equivalent consideration in fixing the "amount realized"
for tax purposes. This question has been considered elementary where
the buyer assumes the mortgage: courts readily include the amount of
the mortgage on the theory that debt assumption is a good form of
consideration.2 This apparently obvious reasoning has, in fact, been
responsible for all the difficulties; for it has seemed to preclude an
acceptable rationale for "realization" where the buyer does not assume
the mortgage, or where the seller himself is not personally responsible
for the mortgage.
Actually, realization is not occasioned by assumption of the debt
encumbering the property, but by disposition of the property itself.
However, because the separateness of these two elements is not always
perceived, there has been a tendency to mistake the tax consequences
of the one for the other, so that the tax results of the sale are rationalized
in terms of mortgage debt assumption or discharge. Finally, in making
debt assumption or its equivalent the touchstone of decision, the tax
cases have made inadequate analysis of the nature of the adjustments
of debtor-creditor relationships occasioned by the transfer of mortgaged
property.
What has been needed was a correct analysis of such adjustments of
'I Portions of the material in this article will appear in a chapter of the forthcoming
revised edition of the "Handbook of Tax Techniques" (Prentice-Hall, Inc.), entitled
"Causes and Effects of a Negative Basis in Mortgage Transactions".
* See Contributors' Section, Masthead, p. 690 infra, for biographical data.
1 Int. Rev. Code § 111.
2 See Brons Hotel, Inc., 34 B.T.A. 376 (1936); Walter Haass, 37 B.TA. 948 (1938).
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liability, and a reassessment of the tax consequences. The former has
been provided in a penetrating article by Professors Storke and Sears
in the Cornell Law Quarterly.3 This article is offered to provide the
latter.
SAMPLINGS OF TROUBLED TAX LAW
No better documentation of the unsatisfactory state of the tax law
is needed than the leading case of Crane v. Commissioner,4 where the
Supreme Court professed to find the same benefit for the grantor in
transferring property subject to a mortgage, for which he was not
personally liable, as would be realized by a personally indebted mort-
gagor whose transferee assumed the mortgage. The value of this benefit
for tax purposes was said to equal the unpaid balance of the mortgage.
The Court allowed that where the property was worth less than the
mortgage, an unindebted transferor's benefit could not equal the full
amount of the mortgage; but the Court skirted this problem by letting
itself believe that the buyer's cash payment of $3,000 over a $250,000
mortgage showed the value of the property to be greater than the
mortgage.
The opinion leaves one groping, as perhaps the Court was itself, for
the basis of the decision. We shall see that the result in the Crane case
appears correct; whereas the problem that plagued the Court in that
case, of finding an equivalent of debt assumption in transfers of en-
cumbered property by unindebted vendors, has led many other courts
into error, if not absurdity. Witness the holdings that a voluntary
conveyance of encumbered property to the mortgagee in lieu of fore-
closure gives the transferor ordinary loss if he receives no "boot" from
the mortgagee, while the receipt of even the most nominal cash con-
sideration-$250 in one case-turns the transaction into one productive
of capital loss.5 Similarly, a mortgagor has been allowed an ordinary
loss if his personal liability had been extinguished prior to his con-
veyance of the property to the mortgagee, but the mortgagor has been
limited to a capital loss if the personal liability is extinguished as
an incident of and in consideration for the conveyance.6
The reason for finding ordinary loss is said to be that unless the un-
indebted transferor of mortgaged property also receives on the transfer
3 Storke and Sears, "Transfer of Mortgaged Property," 38 Comel L.Q. 185 (1953).
4 331 U.S. 1 (1947).
5 Compare Polin v. Comnm'r, 114 F.2d 174 (3d Cir. 1940), and Stokes v. Comm'r, 124
F.2d 335 (3d Cir. 1941), with Blum v. Conm'r, 133 F.2d 447 (2d Cir. 1943).
6 Compare Bert B. Burnquist, 44 B.T.A. 484 (1941), with Richter v. Comm'r, 124
F.2d 412 (2d ir. 1942).
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some cash or other form of "boot," the transaction is without considera-
tion for him, the extinguishment of a lien for which he was not personally
liable not being adequate consideration to produce a "sale or exchange"
under the capital gain and loss provisions.'
Yet, a foreclosure sale is in every instance held to be productive of
capital loss (or gain), because foreclosure is said to involve a "sale"
per se and thus, the reasoning goes, it is not necessary to show con-
sideration passing to the transferor.' On the other hand, abandonment
in anticipation of foreclosure results in ordinary loss'-and in one recent
case,10 it was suggested that abandonment might result in ordinary gain
under appropriate facts! In another opinion, it was intimated that this
gain might go wholly untaxed in case of an abandonment."
NEW TERMINOLOGY FOR SALE TRANSACTIONS
The disparate results in cases with slight factual differences might
have led to the suspicion that the underlying rules were erroneously
premised. That they did not arouse such suspicion is probably due, at
least in part, to the lack of a uniform, concise, and precise terminology
by which the elements in different kinds of transfers might be readily
identified and recognized.
The field of transfers of mortgaged property abounds with ambiguous
phrases like "assumption of the mortgage," and phrases with definitely
false or misleading connotations such as "subject to the mortgage."
There is a total absence of generally accepted, short, descriptive phrases
for certain recurring transactions, resulting in the need to employ cum-
bersome circumlocutions, viz., "the transfer of mortgaged property by
an owner not personally obligated for the mortgage debt."
Professors Storke and Sears have felt the great handicap imposed by
this language barrier, and their remedy has been to coin inventive new
terminology to describe the different kinds of arrangements covering
7 See Int. Rev. Code §§ 112(a), 117(b) and (c).
8 Helvering v. Hammel, 311 U.S. 504 (1941).
9 See Polin v. Coam'r, 114 F.2d 174 (3d Cir. 1940); Rhodes v. Comm'r, 100 F.2d 966
(6th Cir. 1939); but cf. Oregon Mesabi Corp., P-H 1943 TC Mem. Dec. ff 43,356.
10 Parker v. Delaney, 186 F.2d 455 (1st Cir. 1950), cert. denied, 341 U.S. 926 (1951).
"1 The intermediate court in the Crane case stated that if an owner of property who
is not personally liable for the mortgage surrenders the property to the mortgagee or
abandons it without receiving "boot", he cannot be charged with having "realized" the
amount of the mortgage. Comm'r v. Crane, 153 F.2d 504 (2d Cir. 1945), aff'd 331 U.S. 1
(1947). The Supreme Court, in affirming, did not go this far, but left it in doubt what
the result would be in such a case. The effect of the Circuit Court's statement would be
to allow a taxpayer in an appropriate case to get the benefit of excessive depredation, as
pointed out in the discussion of the Crane case at page 614 infra.
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the transfers of encumbered property."2 Crane v. Commissioner was a
case of "Grantee's Option," in the new language of Professors Storke
and Sears-in other words, a case where the buyer takes the property
subject to the mortgage, but does not assume a personal obligation to
pay the mortgage, rather leaving it at his option to "pay off the mortgage
and keep the land, or simply let the land go upon foreclosure."'13
Actually, if additional coining is permissible, the Crane transaction might
be described as Extended Grantee's Option, because the grantor also
had not been personally obligated to pay the mortgage and so, by the
transfer in issue, merely extended the same option to the grantee. In
the typical Grantee's Option case the grantor is personally indebted on
the mortgage.
Grantee's Option is to be distinguished from what the authors call
"Grantor-to-Discharge," and "Grantee-to-Discharge" transactions. These
phrases describe, respectively, transactions where, as one of the terms
of the sale, either the grantor or the grantee personally obligates himself
to pay the mortgage. "Grantee-to-Discharge" is, of course, the familiar
transaction of the buyer assuming the mortgage and getting credit in
the purchase price for the amount of the mortgage. "Grantor-to-
Discharge" is employed most frequently in subdivision sales, where an
entire tract is covered by a single mortgage, and each buyer of a plot
pays the developer the full purchase price without offset for the mortgage;
the developer then may secure a release of lien as to the particular plot
on payment of a portion of the mortgage debt. 4
For precision of reference Storke and Sears suggest that the amount
of cash paid by the buyer in Grantee's Option and Grantee-to-Discharge
cases be termed the "equity price," which they define as the "basic
bargain price," or agreed sales price, reduced by the amount of the
mortgage. "Basic bargain price" and "equity price" are in turn dis-
tinguished from "basic value," which is assumed fair market value
(but not necessarily the sale price), and from "equity value," which is
this "basic value" less the amount of the mortgage.'
5
TiE CRANE CASE
The professors state that the Grantee's Option transaction is most
often employed in the sale of a "thin" equity, i.e., where the property
is mortgaged for all it is worth and the buyer is willing to. take over
12 Storke and Sears, supra note 3, at 186.
13 Id. at 190.
14 Id. at 211.
15 Id. at 186.
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the property for a small cash outlay, representing substantially an
option price, but is not willing to incur any great liability.1" Property
in such an over-mortgaged condition can generally only be released to
the mortgagee or dropped on foreclosure; but there is the occasional
trader who will take such a property for a nominal sum, either to run
away with the.first rents or to gamble on a rising market.
Such was the transaction in the Crane case. Mrs. Crane inherited a
piece of property worth approximately $255,000, which was then en-
cumbered by a mortgage exactly equal to its value. She proceeded to
operate the property under an arrangement with the mortgagee, whereby
she collected the rents, paid the taxes and the expenses of repairs and
maintenance, and turned the net rentals over to the mortgagee to be
applied against interest charges. After several years, and with foreclosure
imminent, she succeeded in interesting a buyer in the property, and
sold it to him for $2,500 net cash. The buyer took subject to the
mortgage but did not assume it (exactly as she had herself done).
During the period of her ownership, she had been allowed depreciation
deductions aggregating approximately $25,000, and the full amount of
depreciation "allowable" was $28,000.17
With some simplification of the figures, Mrs. Crane reported a profit
of $2,500 (actually only $1,250, as long-term capital gain). The Com-
missioner claimed that her profit was $30,500, arguing that she realized
not only the amount of the "boot," but also the full amount of the
mortgage (which still was $255,000), or a total "amount realized" of
$257,500, which had to be compared with an adjusted basis of $227,000
(arrived at by subtracting the "allowable" depreciation from the original
basis of $255,000). The taxpayer conceded that under principles pre-
viously laid down, had she been personally liable for the mortgage and
had her buyer assumed the mortgage, the assumption would have con-
stituted a taxable benefit to her, and the amount of the mortgage would
16 Id. at 190.
17 Int. Rev. Code § 113(b) (1) (B) required, during the years in issue in the Crane
case, an adjustment of basis for depreciation "to the extent allowed (but not less than
the amount allowable)." This statute now subjects the basis adjustment rule to the in-
fluence of the "tax benefit" rule, so that to the extent that depreciation deductions have
been "allowed" in an amount in excess' of what is "allowable," but without tax benefit,
the basis need not be adjusted by the amount of this excess. Int. Rev. Code § 113(b) (1) (B),
as amended 66 Stat. 628 (1952); U.S. Treas. Reg. 118, § 39, 113(b) (1)-i(c) (2) (1952).
Mrs. Crane is reported to have enjoyed tax savings of only $150 from the $25,000 of de-
preciation deductions she claimed; but the new statute would not have helped her, because
her "allowable" depreciation expense exceeded what was "allowed"; and the new statute
requires adjustment of basis at least by the amount of depreciation "allowable," even
though this may have been without tax benefit.
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then have been includible in the "amount realized." But she could not
see the benefit to her in the buyer's taking over her property subject
to a mortgage for which she was not liable.
As noted above, the Supreme Court agreed with the Commissioner,
saying that the benefit to the mortgagor not personally indebted is as
real as if a personal debt had been assumed by the buyer. The principal
reason it offered for this conclusion was that "an owner of property,
mortgaged at a figure less than that at which the property will sell,
must and will treat the conditions of the mortgage exactly as if they
were his personal obligations."
The Court's identification of the benefits accruing to the unindebted
transferor with those of the transferor in a Grantee-to-Discharge sale
was unfortunate. The practical problem before the Court was how to
make the taxpayer pay tax for the $25,000 of depreciation deductions
she had been allowed (as well as the additional $3,000 "allowable")
notwithstanding the absence of any real cost to her of the property.
(That is, since a mortgage represents either debt incurred in lieu of
cash payments of purchase price or subsequent borrowing by way of
recovery of cash payments previously made on the purchase price, where
the mortgage fully equals the cost basis for the property, it signifies
the absence of any cash expenditure, or at least the absence of an
expenditure that has not been restored to the owner.) The problem of
excessive depreciation is normally self-adjusting, because the basis of
the property is correspondingly reduced; so on disposing of the property
the owner accounts for excessive depreciation in the realization of a
smaller loss or greater gain than otherwise. This adjustment is not
possible in the case of encumbered property unless the mortgage is
included in the "amount realized" on disposition.
The soundness of the result in the Crane case may be conceded.18
But it will be demonstrated that to reach this result the Court did not
have to show something in the nature of a release from mortgage
indebtedness; and, moreover, that the Court's showing in this regard
was unconvincing.
18 For discussion of the rule governing depredation of encumbered property advocated
by the Court in the Crane case, see infra pp. 630-2. Commentators have speculated
that Mrs. Crane might have been able to avoid accounting for her depreciation entirely,
had she assigned the property without receiving "boot". Compare Braunfeld, "Subject to
a Mortgage (Part I)," 24 Taxes 424, 442, n. 55 (1946), with Note, 60 Harv. L. Rev. 1324
(1947) ; and see opinion of lower court in Crane case, 153 F.2d 504 (2d Cir. 1945). This
speculation accepts the erroneous thesis that an unindebted mortgagor realizes no con-
sideration, and hence does not engage in a "sale", if he receives no "boot". See infra
pp. 621-623.
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TRANSFEROR'S DIsCHARGE FROM MoRTGAGE DEBT
The sale of mortgaged property invariably results in an adjustment
of the transferor's position in relation to the mortgage debt. Where the
person buying from the transferor-mortgagor assumes the mortgage debt
in the common Grantee-to-Discharge type of transaction, it has been a
cornerstone of the tax law that the transferor has a taxable benefit. With
no little difficulty it also has been established that in the Grantee's Option
case, the personally indebted transferor-mortgagor has a taxable benefit
notwithstanding the failure of the grantee to assume.' 9
In fact there is no reason for a different tax treatment of transferors
in Grantee-to-Discharge cases and Grantee's Option cases, because the
effect of the transaction on the transferor's personal liability is almost
identical in each case. The transferor reduces his personal liability from
that of principal to surety. If he is obliged at some future date to pay
off the mortgage, he is subrogated under the mortgage since the land
remains the primary fund for the payment of the mortgage debt. But
the transferor remains personally liable for the mortgage debt, even
after a transaction in which the grantee assumes personal liability.
The point that has been lost sight of is that no arrangement between
transferor and transferee can discharge the personal liability of the
transferor-mortgagor to the mortgagee.2" The only additional benefit
accruing to a transferor from a sale to a grantee who assumes is that,
in the eventuality of the transferor being held to his personal liability
under the mortgage, he may sue his grantee personally for reimburse-
ment.2' What he has accomplished is not merely to have himself remitted
to the status of a personal surety, but further to reduce himself from
primary to secondary surety responsibility. In contrast, the transferor
in a Grantee's Option sale, while also remitting himself from principal
to surety, has no right of personal recovery against his grantee, since
the only personal liability under the mortgage is that of the transferor
and it survives a Grantee's Option sale.22
However limited may be the effect of the transaction on the trans-
feror's personal liability in both a Grantee-to-Discharge and a Grantee's
Option case, it is nevertheless apparent that the benefits to transferors
in such cases are in no way akin to the benefits accruing to a transferor
19 See U.S. Treas. Reg. 118, § 39.113(a)(6)-2(b), Example 2 (1952). For examples of
the ingenious arguments which have been thought to be necessary to justify the result in
these cases, see Braunfeld, supra note 18; Note, 60 Harv. L. Rev. 1324 (1947).
20 Storke and Sears, supra note 3, at 185, 193.
21 Id. at 193.
22 Id. at 197.
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in an Extended Grantee's Option sale. It is true, of course, that the latter
might be said to be a "real" principal (as distinguished from a "personal"
principal), in the sense that the mortgage is a principal debt of the
property owner with the source of payment limited to realty owned by
him; 3 and in the same fashion it might be said that in parting with the
property the owner rids himself of this "real" liability and passes it on
to the next taker. But there is obviously no personal benefit to the
transferor in shedding a liability for which he was never at any time
indebted. If the basis for including the amount of the mortgage in
the "amount realized" from Grantee-to-Discharge and Grantee's Option
sales is found in the effect of the transaction on the indebtedness of the
transferor, there is no comparable basis in Extended Grantee's Option
cases.
Actually, insulation of the transferor against personal liability does
not provide a sturdy hook on which to hang tax consequences even in
cases of Grantee-to-Discharge and Grantee's Option. As noted above,
the transferor's personal liability remains substantially intact after the
sale. When the grantee also assumes the personal liability, the transferor
merely succeeds in erecting another personal liability before his own to
make good on a deficiency judgment in the event the property declines
in value below the amount of the mortgage after the sale, and the
mortgage is foreclosed. Such value as this might have must be further
discounted by the improbability of its being utilized by the transferor, be-
cause exposure to a deficiency judgment is generally remote and contin-
gent when the sale is made. Hence the benefit to the transferor probably
counts for little in the parties' calculations. Certainly a grantee would
rarely enter into a transaction on these terms if he had reason to feel
that he might one day have to confer the benefits of an assumption
clause on the transferor. Slight as is this benefit, even it is lacking in
a Grantee's Option transaction.
It is clear that the benefits from a sale transaction in terms of its
23 Judge Learned Hand stated this succinctly in the following excerpt from the Circuit
Court's opinion in the Crane case, 153 F.2d 504 (2d Cir. 1945):
The mortgagee is a creditor, and in effect nothing more than a preferred creditor,
even though the mortgagor is not liable for the debt. He is not the less a creditor
because he has recourse only to the land, unless we are to deny the term to one who
may levy upon only a part of his debtor's assets. When therefore upon a sale the
mortgagor makes an allowance to the vendee of the amount of the lien, he secures a
release from a charge upon his property quite as though the vendee had paid him the
full price on condition that before he took title the lien should be cleared, or as though
it were a condition upon the sale of Whiteacre that the vendee should clear the vendor's
Blackacre of a mortgage. In neither case would anyone question the conclusion that
the vendor had received 'property (other than money)'; yet the effect is precisely
the same of the transaction at bar.
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effect on the transferor's personal liability under a mortgage are illusory.
Actually, the only types of sales giving a personally indebted mortgagor
the benefit of an absolute release from personal liability are what
Professors Storke and Sears call the "Clean Methods."24 Under the
Clean Methods, the grantee may pay off the mortgage at the closing,
or refinance the mortgage, or the original mortgagee might consent to
a novation. These transactions are clean for the transferor, because
they have the effect of cutting off all further liability of the transferor
under the mortgage. The transferor can also accomplish this result in
a Grantor-to-Discharge sale if he secures a release of the lien.
2 5
TRANSFERS WITH COMPLEX DEBT ADJUSTMENTS
Even if adjustment or discharge of a transferor's personal liability
provided an analytically sound basis for "realization" of taxable benefit,
it is apparent that such a basis would be unworkable, because of endless
variations that are possible in sale transactions, each affording a different
kind or degree of adjustment of liability. What significance would a
court attach to an assumption of liability by a grantee where the
transferor himself had not been personally liable on the mortgage bond?
This type of transaction where a grantee assumes after a "break in the
chain" of assumption-which might be called "Resumed Grantee-to-
Discharge"-is without legal significance in some states, such as New
York, which narrowly restrict recovery by third-party beneficiaries (in
this case, the mortgagee).2 But there are states which permit the
mortgagee to recover from any assuming grantee, regardless of the
break. The transferor himself derives absolutely no personal benefit
from the assumption, except to the extent he may have personal or
business reasons for conferring a benefit on the mortgagee. Would this
warrant different treatment than the Extended Grantee's Option case
would be accorded by a court disposed not to include the mortgage in
the consideration received in an'Extended Grantee's Option sale?
Another case that would afford difficulty under a rigid "debt assump-
tion" test of realization is where two parcels of land are under the first
lien of the same debt, and one of the parcels is doubly-charged with a
junior lien attaching only to it. In this situation, where the senior
mortgagee has a mortgage on two tracts and the junior mortgagee on
only one, the doctrine of lien marshalling is generally called into play,
24 Storke and Sears, supra note 3, at 187.
25 See p. 614 supra.
26 Storke and Sears, supra note 3, at 198-9.
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to require the senior mortgagee to first satisfy his debt out of the singly-
charged tract.
2 7
If the original mortgagor were to sell the singly-charged tract, a
few jurisdictions hold that the junior mortgagee's equity, i.e., that the
tract not covered by his mortgage shall be first applied to the discharge
of the senior debt, is not operative against a vendee of the singly-
charged tract. These courts apply instead a rule of pro rata liability.
28
Had this sale been a Grantee-to-Discharge, would the amount of the
mortgage to be included in the "amount realized" by the transferor
depend upon the jurisdiction governing the sale? And what would be
the extent of realization, in the majority or minority states, if the doubly-
charged tract were sold Grantee-to-Discharge?
Turning now to subdivided plots, who assumes what in cases of later
sales of'plots which before subdivision comprised parts of a single tract
under a blanket mortgage? Suppose the separate plots were sold in
Grantor-to-Discharge transactions. That was described above as the
case where the grantee pays the transferor the full value of the property
without offset for the encumbrance, imposing on the transferor the duty
of satisfying the mortgage. In the event of default under the mortgage
the doctrine of suretyship marshalling may be invoked to apply a rule
of "forced sale in inverse order of alienation."29 This means that the
last plot sold originally is the first to be charged with the mortgage, and
so on up the ladder until the plot first sold. Thus, successive purchasers
of the various plots may hold their property as "real" principals when
looking up the ladder to earlier purchasers, and as "real" sureties when
looking down the ladder.
Grantees from the original purchasers generally are held to take
subject to these equities;3 ° but the ground rules change if any original
purchaser has assumed the entire mortgages' and the rules change again
if all of the original purchasers acquired their titles in Grantee-to-
Discharge deals.32 It is not hard to imagine the difficulties of analyzing
realization for tax purposes if any of the original purchasers were to
sell his property in a Grantee-to-Discharge, or Extended Grantee's Op-
tion, or whatever, and the tax case had to be decided on a basis of the
assumption or extinguishment of the transferor's liability under the
blanket mortgage.
27 Id. at 201-2, 209.
28 Id. at 209.
29 Id. at 201-4.
30 Id. at 204-5.
31 Id. at 205.
32 Id. at 206-7.
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TAXABILITY OF DISPOSITION PER SE
If debt discharge is not the test of realization, then what is? And
will any other theory provide an acceptable hypothesis for realization
in all cases of the disposition of mortgaged property?
The sale of mortgage property has two distinct elements, the dis-
position of the property, and the discharge from, or adjustment of,
responsibility for the mortgage debt. Each of these may have its own
separate tax consequences. The property disposition produces gain or
loss, as on a sale or exchange under Internal Revenue Code Section 111,
depending upon the relation of the "amount realized" to the basis. The
debt payment, or debt assumption which is its equivalent, normally has
no tax consequences (unless the debt is assumed or discharged at a
discount, in which event ordinary income from the gratuitous cancellation
of indebtedness may be realized).
The two elements are necessarily interrelated and easily confused,
because the discharge from, or assumption of, the mortgage accrues to
the owner as consideration for the disposition of the property. Thus,
because the consideration takes the form of debt discharge or debt
assumption to the extent of the mortgage, it was inevitable that the
cases would characterize the taxpayer's realization of income as stemming
from debt assumption or discharge. In other words, the courts appear
to have tricked themselves into looking for an equivalent of debt dis-
charge in order to support a tax.
There are principally two arguments which have been made to explain
why realization depends on debt discharge or its equivalent. The more
naive of these is that taxable income can arise only on a release from
liability, and where the owner is not liable for the mortgage debt, the
disposition of his property cannot effect for him a release from liability.
This argument simply confuses the concept of ordinary income from
debt cancellation with the unrelated concept of gain attributable to the
consideration received on the disposition of the property. While in these
cases the consideration for the property often takes the form of debt
assumption, or its equivalent, the applicable concept is gain on the
exchange of property for a valuable consideration; and so gratuitous
release from liability is not a factor.
The other argument, and the one which seems to have bothered the
court in the Crane case, correctly treats debt assumption as merely a
form of consideration for the property, but maintains that without debt
assumption there is no consideration and, therefore, no taxable benefit.
What this argument fails to apprehend is that even in the cases of a
1954]
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seller personally liable on the mortgage, the buyer's assumption of the
liability is not what gives rise to taxable income on the disposition of
the property, unless the seller were to fail to give adequate consideration
for the assumption. Observe, however, that the seller gives up property
of a value equal to the debt to get the benefit of the debt assumption.
It is quite the same as if the taxpayer, owing $10 to Y, paid this sum
to X who assumed the debt. The only difference, where the taxpayer,
instead of paying $10 cash to X, transfers to X property worth $10 on
the same terms, is that the taxpayer is also disposing of a piece of
property.
It is the disposition of the property that gives rise to taxable income
in the latter instance. The taxable benefit lies in the payment received
for it. The debt assumption, serving as an element of the payment,
constitutes good consideration for the property and so figures in the
gain or loss from the disposition of the property; but it is not the tax
producer. Thus, where the taxpayer paid $10 to X to have him assume
an obligation to Y, he got good consideration for his $10, but he did
not realize any taxable income because of it. In the same way, where
the taxpayer transfers property to X in consideration for X's assumption
of a liability to Y, the taxpayer does not realize any income or incur
a tax because X assumes his liability. He realizes income only because
he disposes of his property. In fact, if his basis is greater than the
market value of the property, he will realize a loss. It is only where
the value of the property exceeds his basis that he has taxable income.
An owner of mortgaged property will receive the same amount of
consideration on the disposition of his property whether or not he is
personally liable on the mortgage. Debt assumption may be lacking as
an element of consideration in cases of unindebted owners; but that does
not make for an absence of any consideration, unless the unindebted
owner is to be assumed to have given up his property without receiving
any consideration to the extent of the amount of the mortgage. This is
obviously absurd, because the unindebted owner has no less to sell, and
is entitled to no less consideration, than the indebted mortgagor. The
latter can command no more cash over and above the mortgage than
the former. In each case, the amount of the mortgage is automatically
an offset against the amount of cash that would otherwise be paid for
the property. The amount of this offset is readily conceded to be part
of the consideration received by the latter, because it represents a debt
for which he is personally liable; although we have seen that the extent
of the effect of even a Grantee-to-Discharge transaction on the trans-
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feror's personal liability is minimal. Moreover, the owner's personal
liability, or lack of it, obviously has no bearing on the amount of con-
sideration he is entitled to receive for his property. The only thing
that affects this is its intrinsic value; and the transferor is fully com-
pensated for his property if he receives on its transfer the amount of
the intrinsic value in cash and lien extinguishment.
That the lien extinguishment is without personal benefit to the un-
indebted transferor is no bar to its recognition as part of the considera-
tion received for the property. The mortgage debt, even though not
personally owed, is, after all, primarily payable out of the charged
property. It is important not to forget that the personal liability of the
transferor's predecessor in interest-that is, the person who conveyed
the property to him, presumably in a Grantee's Option sale-has become
only a surety liability. 3 One can reify the land by calling the realty
the principal debtor; but it is more helpful to view as the principal
debtor the person whose property can be appropriated as the primary
fund for the payment of the mortgage debt.
In terms of a taxpayer's net worth, he is just as well off to get, in
exchange for the property, release from a debt collectible only out of
that property (assuming the property is worth at least as much as the
debt), as he is to have a debt for which he is personally liable assumed
by another or discharged. 4 As an accounting proposition in both cases
the transferor charges off the debt in crediting the asset account to
which the debt related.
TAXATION OF "FORCED" DISPOSITIONS
The foregoing analysis of the reason for inclusion of the full amount
of the mortgage in every type of transaction, without regard to the
personal liability of the transferor, holds up well enough until one comes
to cases of "negative equities"--a term describing the condition of the
mortgage exceeding the value of the property, so that there is an absence
of any value to the owner's equity, viz., basic value 7, mortgage 10.
When the property gets into this state, the owner is forced to think
seriously of disposing of his property, generally to the mortgagee in
discharge or partial discharge of the mortgage, sometimes via foreclosure,
occasionally by abandonment; and sometimes the owner is fortunate
33 See p. 617 supra.
34 Analogously, the gratuitous cancellation of a debt collectible only out of property
would result in ordinary income, to the extent the taxpayer's equity were increased, in
the same way as if he were personally liable therefor. See Central Paper Co. v. Comm'r,
158 F.2d 131 (6th Cir. 1946).
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enough to find a speculator who is willing to take a chance on the
property for a nominal price.
It obviously takes some explaining to justify counting the full amount
of the mortgage as consideration received by an unindebted transferor
who drops his property in foreclosure at a time when it is worth less
than half of the mortgage standing against it. Even more explaining is
forthcoming when it appears, in those instances where the tax basis of
the property (as distinguished from its basic value) also may be less
than the mortgage, that the result of including the full amount of the
mortgage in the "amount realized" is to charge the owner with a taxable
gain on the occasion of his loss of the property in foreclosure! It was
precisely this situation that prompted the Supreme Court in the Crane
case to remark that in such an instance "the mortgagor who is not
personally liable cannot realize a benefit equal to the mortgage."3 5
There is something paradoxical about charging a taxpayer with gain
from the sale or exchange of property in a year in which he loses his
property to the mortgagee and receives nothing of any tangible value;
that is, his net assets are not increased; generally no money or other
property comes to him as a result of the foreclosure sale; and if he is
not personally liable on the mortgage, no debt for which he is in any
way liable is discharged. On the surface, all that happens is that he
loses an asset for which he receives nothing.
Yet, logically the gain realized in these cases where the tax basis of
the property is less than the amount of the mortgage is nothing more
than the converse of the loss that would be realized were the basis higher
than the amount of the mortgage. The relationship of tax basis to
mortgage should have no bearing on whether the full amount of the
mortgage must be included in the "amount realized."
Nevertheless, the courts have preferred to avoid facing this problem
by refusing to acknowledge the existence of a negative equity in several
cases. In the Crane case, the court jumped on the buyer's willingness
to give some "boot" as proof of a positive equity. In Parker v. Delaney,38
where the taxpayer took over property held by a bank after foreclosure,
giving back only a mortgage and no cash, and then operated it for about
10 years, quitclaiming it to the bank when the mortgage was in default,
the court said there was no evidence that the value of the property was
less than the mortgage! And in Woodsam Associates, Inc.,37 where tax-
36 331 U.S. 1, 14, n. 37 (1947).
36 186 F.2d 455 (1st Cir. 1950).
37 16 T.C. 649 (1951), aff'd 198 F.2d 357 (2d Cir. 1952).
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payer's predecessor had mortgaged the property for more than its original
cost and the taxpayer later lost the property in foreclosure, the Tax
Court refused to make a finding as to the value of the property, not-
withstanding unchallenged testimony that it was worth roughly $60,000
less than the mortgage.
Even where the owner is personally liable on the mortgage, it is
difficult to justify a finding that the owner has "realized" the full amount
of the mortgage in consideration for the assignment of his property which
is worth less than the mortgage; for it seems perfectly obvious that
where the mortgagee accepts the property in full discharge of the
mortgage, though it is not worth as much as the debt, the owner has
received the benefit of some debt cancellation, which is taxable as
ordinary income.
38
If the property is worth less than the debt, the creditor only receives
pro tanto consideration for his debt-on the above figures, only 7 out
of the 10. Conversely, the only consideration he gives to the property
owner is pro tanto discharge of the debt; the balance of what he gives
to the property owner is gratuitous forgiveness of the unsatisfied portion
of the debt. The property owner does not get this portion of the debt
discharge as consideration for his property, any more than, if he had
paid the creditor an equal amount in cash, it could be said that the
full amount of the debt discharge was attributable to and given in
consideration for the cash payment.
The cases have, nevertheless, ignored the debt forgiveness feature,
and called the entire amount of the difference between the basis and
the mortgage capital gain on the disposition of the property.3 9 In a
loose sense, of course, the debt is being given up for the property, and
perhaps the simplicity of operation warrants the merging of the debt
cancellation and the true consideration. The only effect of this is to
convert ordinary income into capital gain (with judicial sanction).
But where the owner is not personally liable, it is hard to justify
counting the full amount of the mortgage, even under any relaxed theory
of consideration. His debt is limited to the value of his property since
that is the only source of its payment. Any excess of the mortgage
over the value of the property must be extinguished willy-nilly, and
38 United States v. Kirby Lumber Co., 284 U.S. 1 (1931); Comm'r v. Jacobson, 336
U.S. 28 (1949); Marshall Drug Co. v. U.S., 95 F. Supp. 820 (ct. cl. 1951), cert. denied
341 U.S. 948 (1950); Astoria Marine Construction Co., 12 T.C. 798 (1949); Spear Box
Co., 13 T.C. 238 (1949), aff'd 182 F.2d 844 (2d Cir. 1950).
39 O'Dell & Sons Co., 8 T.C. 1165 (1947), aff'd, 169 F.2d 247 (3d Cir. 1948)
(foreclosure); Peninsula Properties Co., 47 B•T.A. 84 (1942) (voluntary conveyance).
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cannot be productive of debt cancellation income. ° Consequently, to
charge him with the full amount of the mortgage constitutes more than
just converting ordinary debt cancellation income into capital gain. This
accounts for the Supreme Court's dictum that the mortgagor who is not
personally liable cannot realize a benefit equal to the mortgage where
the value of the property is less than the amount of the mortgage.
Nevertheless, the cases which have had to decide the problem have
reached the same result as where the mortgagor is personally liable,
that is, they have included the full amount of the mortgage as capital
gain. In one of the earliest cases to find a gain under the circumstances
of a negative equity, the taxpayer had acquired improved real property
on its organization in August 1924. Its cost was not indicated in the
opinion. Five months later, in January 1925, the taxpayer received a
loan of $361,000, to secure which it gave its bond and mortgage on the
property. In 1934 the debt was reduced by amortization to $300,000,
and the taxpayer was released of personal liability on the mortgage.
In 1937, when the mortgage was past due, the taxpayer transferred the
property to the mortgagee in lieu of foreclosure. The property was then
worth $97,000, and had an adjusted basis of $257,435.42. The Tax
Court held that the taxpayer realized a gain in 1937 in the amount of
the difference between the basis and the debt.4 It noted, in passing,
that "the $300,000 was received by the petitioner in 1925, but the
taxable transaction took place in 1937." It also observed that the
release of personal liability in 1934 was not an event having tax con-
sequences.
In the Woodsam case, the Second Circuit expressly declined to follow
the implications of the above-mentioned Crane dictum. In simplified
form, the facts were that an individual acquired property for a total pur-
chase price in cash and mortgage liability of $300,000, and subsequently
refinanced the mortgage, getting a new mortgage of $400,000 without
personal liability. Thereafter the individual conveyed the property to
his corporation in a tax-free transfer under section 112(b)(5), the
corporation taking subject to but not assuming the mortgage. The
property was still later foreclosed when the mortgage was substantially
unchanged, but the property had fallen off in value quite considerably.
The court required the corporate taxpayer to include the full amount of
the mortgage in the "amount realized," and report gain on this basis.
40 See Fulton Gold Corp., 31 B.T.A. 519 (1934); P. J. Hiatt, 35 B.T.A. 292 (1936);
Hotel Astoria, Inc., 42 B.T.A. 759 (1940); cf. Charles Nutter, 7 T.C. 480 (1946).
41 Lutz & Schramm Co., 1 T.C. 682 (1943).
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There is obvious practical and equitable justification for the results
in the above two cases, because otherwise the taxpayer would have
escaped accounting for excessive depreciation in the former case, and
for the mortgage profit realized in the latter case. One alternative that
could be devised to assure taxing the profits made by mortgaging prop-
erty for more than cost would be to levy the tax at the time of placing
the mortgage. The author has made the argument for the earlier tax
elsewhere 42 but this argument was expressly repudiated by the court
in the Woodsam case, largely because the indebtedness resulting from
the mortgage borrowing was thought to preclude realization of gain.
Nevertheless, a couple of new sections in the House version of the
currently pending Revenue Code of 1954, come close to adopting the
position rejected in the Woodsam opinion. One, Section 356(2), ac-
celerates the tax on the mortgage profit, not to the time of placing the
mortgage, but to the time of transfer where the property is transferred
to a controlled corporation in an otherwise tax-free transfer after having
been mortgaged for more than the amount of its cost basis. Another new
section, 308 (c), would impose a tax on the mortgage profit of a corpora-
don on the occasion of declaring a dividend in kind of the mortgaged
property. It is probable that these sections are products of the revela-
tions of tax avoidance possibilities inhering in "mortgaging out"-i.e.,
borrowing against the property without personal liability more money
than is represented by the owner's investment-which have been a high-
light of the recent Congressional hearings into the Federal Housing
Administration.
Another technique which can be suggested for assuring full accounting
for all mortgage or depreciation benefits, but without indulging in the
fiction of realization in the full amount of the mortgage, is to treat
the excess of the mortgage over the value of the property as debt
forgiveness, with a corollary reduction of the owner's tax basis by the
amount of debt forgiven. A similar technique has been employed in
cases involving cancellation of indebtedness incurred in connection with
the acquisition of property.43 While debt cancellation is normally produc-
tive of ordinary income, these cases permit reduction of the cost basis
as a substitute for the realization of debt cancellation income.
The justification for extending this technique to the case of an un-
indebted mortgagor is that if his basis includes the full amount of his
42 Note, "Mortgagor's Gain on Mortgaging Property For More than Cost Without
Personal Liability," 6 Tax L. Rev. 319 (1951).
43 See Hirsch v. Comm'r, 115 F.2d 656 (7th Cir. 1940); see also Rabkin & Johnson,
Federal Income, Gift and Estate Taxation, §§ 36.05, 36.06.
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mortgage, or if the basis reflects an amount of original cash investment
which has been subsequently recouped through a subsequent mortgage
borrowing, it is obviously unfair to allow him to compute gain or loss
with all of this in his basis, if he is not also required to account for this
amount via inclusion of the full amount of the mortgage as "amount
realized" on. the disposition of the property. The suggested technique
would take out of the basis that part of the mortgage which is not ac-
counted for on disposition-that is, the excess of the mortgage over
the property's value-and require the property owner to count as
consideration for his property only the value of the property.
The First Circuit, to achieve an equitable result which would prevent
a taxpayer from avoiding accounting for depreciation deductions taken
in excess of any cash investment, would even require an unindebted
owner to report income on an abandonment of the mortgaged property,
but would make the income reportable as ordinary income rather than
capital gain (even where the property is a capital asset) for the reason
that an abandonment does not constitute a "sale or exchange. ' 44
This court viewed ordinary income on an abandonment of property
carried with a negative basis (i.e., where the tax basis is less than the
mortgage) as simply the converse of the ordinary loss found in cases
of the abandonment of mortgaged property with a positive basis.45 It
is submitted that there is no real converse to an abandonment loss, any
more than there could be a converse to a casualty loss. Perhaps the
answer is to declare that mortgaged property cannot be "abandoned"
within the meaning of that concept for tax purposes.46 That is, if the
property has any value, the mortgagee will claim it and satisfy his debt
out of it; and to this extent the owner receives consideration even on
an abandonment, with the result that he has a sale or exchange which
would qualify for capital treatment if the property is a "capital asset."
Collateral support for this position is found in the Oregon Mesabi
Corporation case,47 where the Tax Court, dealing with a contention of
taxpayer that its quitclaiming of overencumbered land to the county for
taxes amounted to an abandonment since it received no consideration,
saw no substantial difference between this and a foreclosure. Said the
Court:
In the present case, petitioner, in order to avoid foreclosure for unpaid
taxes, conveyed the property to the County. If it had not made the con-
44 Parker v. Delaney, 186 F.2d 455 (1st Cir. 1950), cert. denied 341 U.S. 926 (1950).
45 See cases cited note 9 supra.
46 See, to this effect, Braunfeld, supra note 18, at 436-445.
47 1943 P-H TC Mem. Dec. ff 43,356.
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veyance and the County had foreclosed in the same year, there is no ques-
tion that its loss would have been a capital loss. We cannot see why a
different result should be reached because of the giving of the quitclaim
deeds. The conveyance to the County was as much a "forced" conveyance
as a foreclosure sale would have been. The fact that a consideration did
not move to petitioner is immaterial.
Had such a fundamental approach prevailed in the decision of other
cases of loss on the disposition of over-encumbered property, this field
would, not now be cluttered with rules by which the receipt of a little
"boot" may change an ordinary loss into a capital loss, and where a
voluntary conveyance in lieu of foreclosure is one thing, but a fore-
closure is another, and an abandonment is something else again.
NOMINAL SALES TO STRANGERS
One other type of case of "negative equity" remains for considera-
tion-that is, where property encumbered in an amount at or near the
amount of the mortgage is sold for a nominal amount of cash to a
stranger (as distinguished from the mortgagee or one buying at a fore-
closure sale). It was noted above that the Crane case appears to have
involved such a deal. A variation of this is found in cases where the
property is conveyed to the mortgagee for a nominal consideration, but
with the mortgage not being permitted to merge.48
The question occurs whether the owner should be required to include
in his "amount realized" the full amount of the mortgage plus the
"boot," just as if the property were actually worth more than the
mortgage and commanded the boot on its market value. Since the cases
include the full mortgage even in cases of negative equity, it would
seem that the same result should follow in these hybrid cases a fortiori,
with the addition of the "boot" to the "amount realized." Furthermore,
it does not make any difference to the transferor why the grantee is
taking over the property and paying a nominal sum, so that it would
be hard to justify a different result from the Extended Grantee's Option
cases of actual positive equity.
The rule should possibly be different in Grantee's Option cases, that
is, where the transferor is liable on the bond, but the grantee does not
assume it. Here, since the property is worth less than the mortgage
and, as events stand then, it is likely that the transferor will be called
upon to satisfy a deficiency judgment in the future, it might not be
good policy to charge him with the full amount of the mortgage plus
48 See, e.g., Kohn v. Comm'r, 197 F.2d 480 (2d Cir. 1952), aff'g 16 T.C. 960; Walter
F. Sheehan, 1950 P-H TC Mem. Dec. ff 50,138.
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the "boot" at the time of his sale, only to give him a compensating loss
when the deficiency is subsequently required to be paid. An alternative
would be to charge him with only the value of the property (if it can
be readily established) plus the "boot" as consideration received on his
sale, and to charge him with additional income (probably debt cancella-
tion income) only if the mortgage is subsequently discharged without
his having to pay any deficiency. Authorities are lacking either way.
TRANSFEROR'S BASIS FOR GAiN OR Loss
No matter what terms one uses to explain the inclusion of the amount
of the mortgage in the "amount realized" on disposition, there will al-
ways be some who will feel uncomfortable about an unindebted trans-
feror "realizing" the amount of a mortgage debt. It should be pointed
out that, simply in terms of tax result, it would not be necessary to count
the mortgage in the "amount realized" if an amount equivalent to the
mortgage were also excluded from the tax basis for the property; for the
amount of taxable gain or loss does not depend alone on the "amount
realized," but rather on a comparison of this amount with the basis.4 9
Thus, in the Crane case for example, the taxpayer could have been
said to have "realized" only the $2,500 "boot" that she reported; and
her original basis could be said to have been zero on her acquisition of
the property, by excluding the amount of the mortgage, and to have
then been adjusted downward to minus $28,000 by reason of deprecia-
tion allowable. The result would be a gain of $30,500, as the Commis-
sioner found. This mode of computation has been suggested in a con-
curring opinion in one case.
50
There are, however, several objections to this technique. For one
thing, it would obviously require the acceptance of a minus basis in
certain cases, which is something abhorrent to the tax law.5' Moreover,
basis is derived from what is paid for the property; and where the
property has been bought without encumbrances and the mortgage is
placed afterwards, the basis would initially equal the full purchase price
and would have to be reduced by the amount of the mortgage-pre-
sumably on the occasion of the placing of the mortgage. Only where the
encumbrance is a purchase money mortgage, or otherwise figures in the
consideration paid for the property, could the amount of the mortgage
be left out of the basis at the outset, with the taxpayer's basis being
limited to his equity in the property.
49 See Int. Rev. Code § 111.
50 Magruder, Ch. J., concurring in Parker v. Delaney, 186 F.2d 455 (1st Cir. 1950).
51 See Crane v. Comm'r, 331 U.S. 1, 10 (1947).
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However, the Supreme Court in the Crane case expressly rejected
an equity basis wherever the mortgage is reflected in the purchase price
of the property, as where the buyer gives a purchase money mortgage,
or assumes an existing one, or even simply takes subject to one. Thus,
where what has been called above52 the "basic bargain price" is $25,000,
being paid $10,000 in cash and $15,000 in mortgage debt, the tax basis
is $25,000. This rule is even applied where the mortgagee himself 'ac-
quires the property without permitting the mortgage to merge."
The Supreme Court's conclusions regarding the. inclusion of purchase
money encumbrances in basis were primarily rationalized in terms of
depreciation. The basis for depreciation is by statute the same as the
basis for gain;6 4 and if this basis were dependent upon the owner's equity
in his property, depreciation deductions would follow amortization of
the mortgage. This would require repeated recomputations of basis and
of annual depreciation allowances. The Court noted that the amount
of depreciation allowances would thereby be sharply curtailed in rela-
tion to the physical exhaustion of the property. More precisely, of
course, the distortion of the depreciation account would be manifested
by understatement in the earlier and presumably bigger income years
of the property and exaggeration in the declining income years.51
The Court's fundamental objection to a shifting basis for depreciation
is obviously sound.56 Such criticism as has been directed at the Crane
depreciation rule pertains only to the possibility it opens up to an
investor to recapture substantially more than his net cash investment via
depreciation deductions,5 7 or to continue to take depreciation deductions
52 See text accompanying note 15 supra.
53 Walter F. Sheehan, 1950 P-H TC Mem. Dec. ff 43,356; cf. Kohn v. Comm'r, 197 F.2d
480 (2d Cir. 1952), (rule not applied where property worth less than the encumbrance).
54 Int. Rev. Code § 114(a).
55 The author of a Comment in 26 Texas L. Rev. 796 (1948) gives the example of a
building, with an estimated life of 50 years, bought by the taxpayer for $20,000 cash,
subject to a mortgage of $60,000, which the taxpayer is to amortize at the rate of
$1,500 per year for 40 years. If the down-payment and each subsequent payment were
amortized over the remaining life of the building from the date of each payment, the
schedule of depreciation allowances would be as follows: 1st year-400.00; 2d year-
$430.60; 3d year-461.85; . . . 41st to 50th years-$2,880.00 (each year). Thus the
allowance for the last years is more than seven times that for the first year.
56 For treatment of the problems of depredation of mortgaged property generally, see
Braunfeld, supra note 18 (Part III), 25 Taxes 155 (1947); Comment, 26 Texas L. Rev.
796 (1948); Notes, 13 U. of Chi. L. Rev. 510 (1946), 6 Tax L. Rev. 319 (1951). For
function of depreciation deduction, see Comm'r v. Crane, 153 F.2d 504 (2d Cir. 1945),
aff'd 331 U.S. 1 (1947).
57 E.g., Comment, 26 Texas L. Rev. 796 (1948); Note, 21 So. Calif. L. Rev. 112
(1947); cf. Note, 13 U. of Chi. L. Rev. 510 (1946). Observe, however, that this excessive
depreciation will be taxed (though only at capital gain rates, if the property is a
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after his equity is wiped out by a decline in the actual value of the
property. 8 These considerations are not likely to cause the overturning
of the Crane rule of basis for depreciation; and there is obvious virtue
to an identical basis for the computation of both depreciation and gain
or loss, which lies not merely in the resultant statutory symmetry but
also in the avoidance of administrative complications on audit that could
seriously disrupt the workings of our system of voluntary self-assess-
ment. Hence, inclusion of the mortgage in the "amount realized," even
if it were not analytically supportable, would be preferable to excluding
the mortgage from basis.
CONCLUSION
The first sin in the cases of taxation of transfers of mortgaged prop-
erty involved a failure to identify the element in the transaction that
made for "realization." There followed a host of cases in which the
results were made to depend on whether or not the transferor's debt was
assumed, or whether he himself was even personally liable. Further dis-
tinctions were based on the kind of disposition involved, i.e., whether
voluntary sale, foreclosure sale, or abandonment.
Hence, all of these cases appear to be erroneously premised. Having
made "debt discharge," or its equivalent, the sina qua non to realization
of consideration in the amount of the mortgage, the cases then overstated
the effect of a sale on the personal mortgage indebtedness of the trans-
feror. And so error mounted on error until in relatively recent cases
courts have found it difficult under the rigid "debt discharge" test to
find realization of gains which their consciences tell them must be taxed,
as when a taxpayer on disposing of property has a tax basis that is lower
than the amount of the mortgage, signifying a prior untaxed benefit to
him at least to the extent of the excess of mortgage over basis. Even
so, the fact that the earlier precedents may have formulated the issues
erroneously appears to have gone unsuspected.
capital asset) on the disposition of the property. The author of the Comment in 26 Texas
L. Rev. 796 (1948), has suggested an ingenious formula for cutting off depreciation de-
ductions when the aggregate cash investment has been fully recovered through depredation,
and for resuming the deductions upon additional mortgage payments, while at the same
time avoiding the distortions of the formula outlined in note 55 supra.
58 Note, 49 Col. L. Rev. 845 (1949). The notewriter in 13 U. of Chi. L. Rev. 510 (1946),
while concurring in the view that a taxpayer should not be allowed to take depreciation
deductions after the absence of equity makes it unlikely that he will pay off the mortgage,
if he is not personally indebted for it, nevertheless points to the complications for tax-
payer and the Government if depreciation deductions are made dependent on the actual
value of the property at any given time.
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The judicial instincts have, nevertheless, been unerring in the recent
cases. If the reasoning has been arguable, the results have not. A correct
appreciation of the significance of each of the separate elements of debt
discharge and property disposition inhering in every transfer of mort-
gaged property would have simply enabled the cases to have been de-
cided more easily, not more soundly. But if a return to the errors that
marked the earlier cases is to be avoided in the harder cases that lie
ahead, judicial analysis of sale and other transactions involving mort-
gaged property will have to be made anew.
